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Abstract 
International organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), governments and the private sector have not found a 
long-term solution to public service delivery. (1) (2) The paper establishes a framework that makes Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP) more accessible to developing countries. A partnership between government, NGOs, and the private sector in order to 
allocate risk to the one who is able to avoid or mitigate them and responsibilities to the most capable in order to have a 
sustainable service delivery to the beneficiaries in an financially sound way.    
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1. Three partners 
This article proposes the inclusion of NGOs in the current PPP framework to better allocate risks and costs of a 
specific project. The article introduces some characteristics of the NGO industry and identifies some of the issues 
regarding long-term results. A brief introduction to traditional PPP’s advantages as well as downsides leads to the 
need of a new partner that is more risk taker than the private sector to the equation. 
 The new proposed framework called Public Private Not-for-profit Partnerships (PPNP) distributes 
responsibilities to each partner in a way that a project in a developing country can obtain the most value for money. 
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2. Non-governmental organizations / Not-for-profit organizations 
NGOs deliver services that traditionally have been provided by the government as a result of technological or 
management incapacities or more important because of the lack of monetary resources. Governments in developing 
countries usually do not have the capital needed to invest in infrastructure expansion or repair. Additionally, the 
private sector is not interested in low returns in highly unstable countries, as risk increases the expected return value 
increases as well. (1) NGOs, on the other hand, easily fill the gap between government and private sector. The 
unattended need for public services is the market for the Not-for-profit or Non-governmental organization (NGO) 
industry. As a result, NGOs’ sectors range from healthcare, water and sanitation, to education, research and social 
development.  
As an example, water and sanitation has been an important sector for NGOs because of their not-for-profit 
oriented scheme, the flagrant need of communities for clean water, and the palpable short-term results. Despite that 
many NGOs and governments have worked to improve water access, long lasting results have been an exception. In 
Kenya, for example, in 2006 there are more than 4,000 (2) different NGOs actively operating and many in water and 
sanitation. Some of those NGOs, like Kenya Water for Health Organization (KWAHO) have been operating for 
more than 30 years. According to the World Bank figures, more than 40% of rural water systems in Kenya are non-
functional. These figures are consistent through most of sub-Saharan Africa where the World Bank estimates a lost 
investment due to nonfunctional systems at about $1.25 billion dollars over the past 20 years. (1) 
NGOs through UN and World Bank funding have not been able to improve in a sustainable manner water access 
in rural communities. An important reason is that NGOs are incapable of sustaining long term maintenance, 
operation and reconstruction costs due to their funding. Figure 1 represents a common example of an NGO working 
process. NGOs usually have a project based approach and are looking forward to train the community to operate the 
infrastructure once the funding for that specific project is over. Due to this short view of development many of the 
NGO projects have failed.  
The service delivery approach (SDA) has been gaining momentum during recent years. (3) SDA recognizes that 
the project based approach is not only bound to fail but it requires much more money to invest and the service 
declines within years or even months of being built. Hence the importance of long-term commitment from all the 
parties involved. Lockwood, et al present a continuum of approaches where project based or “implementation” 
approach sits on one end and SDA on the other. The book looks into some factors that have contributed to service 
provision failure concluding that a systematic change from government, NGOs, and private sector, towards enduring 
service provision is critical for improvement. 
Fig. 1. NGO project-based process 
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3. Service Driven Public-Private Partnerships 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) arise as a result of the continued budgetary constraints faced by various 
governments and the exhaustion of opportunities for outright privatization of public infrastructure. (4)  
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA) defines PPPs as a contract in which a private party takes responsibility 
for the design and construction of a component of infrastructure, takes over long term lease or concession over 
existing assets, and/or a long term contract to operate and manage the infrastructure. In PPPs, the government buys a 
“stream of services that the private partner generates with the asset” and which ownership and responsibility for 
operation and maintenance remain with the private operator. (5) It is important to appreciate the importance of a 
service driven scheme compared to the traditional project based. PPP’s rely on three propositions as foundations to 
work properly. (6) First, PPPs should encourage trust between the parties and share information. Second, the 
partnerships have to consider the competencies of each provider and exploit them. “Strategic partnering can provide 
access to new skills, resources and ways of doing things and allow innovation”. (7) Last, in PPPs improvement is 
driven by service standards rather than to drive down costs. (6) 
According to IPA’s study Performance of PPPs and Traditional Procurement in Australia, PPP’s in Australia have 
proven to be around 30% more cost efficient, completed earlier, and have a more transparent process than traditional 
procurement. (8) As a result, today many developing countries are trying to get the necessary policies and laws to 
make PPPs so they can access WB, IFC and other International Organization’s (IO) funding. On the other hand for 
profit organizations usually exploit the economic resources of their environments more effectively than not for profit 
organizations. (9) 
3.1. PPP’s downside 
PPPs have been used for more than twenty years, yet they have not reached every country. PPP’s expansion has 
been hindered because of some country’s inability to provide the required framework. This slowdown in PPP 
growth can be explained by the cost of capital defined as the rate of return expected by the shareholders from a 
specific investment. In PPPs shareholders (i.e. banks, IO, private shareholders) expect different rates of return 
depending on a project’s risk allocation. Availability of a suitable financial market was ranked first by the researches 
in Uganda and Nigeria as a critical success factor for PPPs (4) (10). Cost of capital may be called interest rate when 
the shareholder is a Bank, figure 4 presents a sample of the lending interest rate by country according to the World 
Bank. (11) 
 Lending Interest Rate 
% of population with 
access to improved 
sanitation facilities 
Country 2000 2012 2011 
United 
Kingdom 6.0% 0.5% 100.0% 
Japan 2.1% 1.4% 100.0% 
United States 9.2% 3.3% 100.0% 
Mexico 16.9% 4.7% 85.0% 
China 5.9% 6.0% 65.0% 
South Africa 14.5% 8.8% 74.0% 
India 12.3% 10.6% 35.0% 
Nigeria 21.3% 16.8% 31.0% 
Kenya 22.3% 19.7% 29.0% 
Uganda 22.9% 26.3% 35.0% 
Fig. 2. Lending interest rate and % of population with access to improved sanitation facilities by country 
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According to the figures of the World Bank, the cost of capital increases as the country has more need for 
infrastructure improvements. Nigeria’s infrastructure challenge is huge and the government is unable of mustering 
the resources (financial and expertise) needed to meet the standard infrastructure requirements. (4) Developing 
countries are usually incapable of improving macroeconomic conditions and the cost of capital is higher than in 
more developed countries.  
Private companies usually expect higher returns while working on developing countries, hence the cost of having 
a private company operating and maintaining throughout the life time of the PPP contract will decrease the project’s 
value for money. “Once again, public-private partnerships represent an industrialized-country public policy 
prescription applied in third world settings. The overriding question facing development scholars and policy analysts 
today is the appropriateness of PPPs to third world needs.” (12) 
 
4. A new scheme: PPNPs (Public private not-for-profit partnerships) 
In PPPs, the high cost of capital for private companies entering developing countries may withhold many 
infrastructure projects by increasing their cost of maintenance. The amount of risk that is allocated to the private 
sector will impact directly the expected rate of return by the shareholders. In contrast, NGO incentives may differ 
from private companies.  
In general, NGOs are risk takers, while private companies are more risk averse. Although many NGOs may have 
headquarters in stable rich countries, they commonly work in developing countries which private companies 
generally do not see as an investment opportunity. As Besley describes it “[…] the private sector activity in the 
public good is value-driven –non-profit organizations are frequently motivated by the desire to help the beneficiaries 
of the public goods” (13). In his paper, he acknowledged that the party that cares most about the project should 
answer for the provision of goods.  
Private companies are efficient service providers if their incentive is to make the most profit out of a contract. In 
contrast, governments’ incentives are to provide services to the public and NGOs usually seek an altruistic outcome. 
Additionally, not-for-profit organizations have a competitive advantage over profit-maximizing firms because their 
preference for output over profit allows them to absorb pricing below average cost. This implies that altruists are the 
first to enter and the last to leave any industry or country (14).  
4.1. Developing a Framework 
The framework developed in this study seeks to obtain the most value for money in an infrastructure project 
through the involvement of many partners that are described in the following section. As a common private public 
partnership, sometimes there is a need to invest money to build, reconstruct, or retrofit the infrastructure. The 
investors, through the private shareholders (shareholders), have the ownership of the project for the amount of time 
necessary to repay the debt with their expected rate of return. The investors include International Organizations (e.g. 
World Bank, IFC, IDB, etc.), a commercial and/or national development bank, and the private shareholders.  
 
 A special purpose vehicle (SPV) has to be constituted by the shareholders and its revenues are compromised to 
the International Organization, the Banking Institution, and to the shareholders. The SPV is responsible of fulfilling 
two tasks to receive a complete payment for service (PS1). It should make infrastructure available (IA) and deliver a 
specific service to the NGO (S). The government is required to pay for the service provided (PS1) to the SPV as 
defined below: 
 
PS1 = IA+S 
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The first task is to build or rehabilitate the infrastructure necessary to provide the service that the public needs. 
The SPV contracts a private construction company and pays them with investors’ money. Only when the 
infrastructure is complete then the SPV may receive the payment by the government for infrastructure availability 
(IA) defined as the payment needed to repay the debts and the shareholders’ investment. Secondly, the SPV will 
provide a service through a private maintenance company. Using SDA, both payments should be susceptible to 
deductions for deficient service or availability. The NGO is responsible of providing the final service to the public 
FSP. This service may be paid by the government (PS2), the NGO’s funding partner (PS3) and/or from the public 
themselves (PS4). 
  
FSP = (PS2) + (PS3) + (PS4) 
 
Just as in the IA and S, these payments should be susceptible to deductions if the service did not meet the 
government’s or the funding partner’s requirements and multiplied by a specific inflation factor. Applying this 
framework will require numerous negotiations between parties to reach agreements. It should be used for 
infrastructure investments with long-term contracts between all parties. 
4.2. Water example 
 In many large water projects there is an initial investment in infrastructure such as building or rehabilitating a 
dam, a pumping station, reservoir, or an aqueduct. The private company would be responsible of building and 
maintaining this infrastructure for the amount of years necessary for the government to repay their investment and 
O&M costs and to be sure that risks stay with the partner who can control them. The second part in such a project 
would be delivering water to the communities and households. This systems are to be built and managed by the 
NGO who has the experience with delivering services directly to the beneficiaries. Government would oversee how 
both tasks are done and the overall satisfaction of the beneficiaries. Funding partners can measure with a SDA how 
the NGO is performing as well, and therefore assuring that their funds are being allocated in an efficient manner. By 
government subsidies and the funding partners’ grants to the NGO, the price the beneficiaries would have to pay 
could be within their possibilities. 
Fig. 3. PPNP framework 
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5. Conclusions 
In general, NGOs are risk takers, while private companies are more risk averse. As a result, NGOs have the 
knowhow and the appropriate incentives to partner with the private and public sector to deliver public services. The 
need for infrastructure could be tackled by new ways to see partnerships. Private companies, banks, and IOs expect 
some kind of assurance of their investments, this warranties are expensive for the Public sector limiting its ability to 
acquire more loans or to invest in different projects. Therefore, minimizing the participation of the private sector the 
government is able to allocate their budget more efficiently. Government, private companies, and nonprofit 
organizations could participate together to develop infrastructure projects spending less resources and assuring the 
sustainability of the project. By distributing resources and risk correctly International Organizations will stop 
funding nonfunctional systems and turn to a long term commitment with their partners.  
The proposed framework is a general one and should be adapted to the specific conditions. This article does not 
intend to be comprehensive in the deduction nor the inflation formulas that should be developed to match each 
project needs. The framework should be used as a tool to prepare a project in a way that we can improve the public 
service delivered to the beneficiaries, decrease the investors’ risk, reduce the amount of money the government has 
to pay for construction operation and maintenance, improve the NGOs’ accountability to government and their 
funding partners, and increase the effectiveness and impact of donors’ money. Government supervision as well as a 
collaborative attitude is essential to a PPNP success.  
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